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HYBRIDITY EMERGENT: GEO-HISTORY, LEARNING, AND LAND 
RESTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Abstract:  
Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR), which is advocated by the World Bank and is being 
implemented in various contexts around the world, is a more neo-liberal approach to land reform 
than what we have seen implemented in the past. MLAR principles have underpinned South 
Africa’s land reform programme, being based on the ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ principle, 
which guarantees market-related prices to sellers. Evidence presented in this paper, however, 
raises serious questions about the extent to which the South African government has held on to 
MLAR principles. Specifically, the paper argues that South Africa’s peculiar geo-historical 
context has in some instances led the government to fuse market-led approaches with more 
authoritarian interventions that dictate to land reform beneficiaries how the land will be used. A 
case in point is the government’s approach to restitution of land rights to communities 
dispossessed from the Levubu area of Limpopo province. As the paper illustrates, the 
government has imposed on the intended beneficiaries a so-called ‘strategic partnership’ between 
them and agribusinesses. Although the government touts the approach as a way to protect the 
commercial viability of the land and to transfer skills from white farmers to the beneficiaries, the 
terms of the Levubu solution may turn out to be less than favourable for the beneficiaries.  
Keywords: South Africa, Restitution, Land reform, Limpopo  
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HYBRIDITY EMERGENT: GEO-HISTORY, LEARNING, AND LAND 
RESTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1. Introduction 
South Africa’s Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 ‘gives effect to the constitutional 
provision that people unfairly dispossessed after 1913 are entitled either to restitution of that 
property or to compensation’ (Hall, 2004 p.12).  Almost 80,000 claims for restitution were 
lodged with the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights, which was established by the Act 
to ‘solicit and investigate claims for restitution and to prepare them for settlement’ (ibid.). If 
progress in restitution is measured in terms of the number of claims settled, the pace of delivery 
has increased dramatically in recent years. According to Hall, ‘By the end of August 2004, a 
cumulative total of 56 650 claims had been settled, resulting in the transfer of 810 292ha of land 
(just under 1% of all agricultural land in the country) at a cost of abut R1.5 billion’1 (op cit p.13). 
Yet, given that ‘R2.5 billion had been paid out or promised to claimants as cash or other forms of 
compensation’, and that only 36% of claims have been settled with land (Hall, 2004 p.13), 
restitution has made only very limited strides in undoing the racialized character of land 
ownership in South Africa. However, there are now signs that land transfers under restitution are 
increasingly on the government’s agenda; the 2005 National Budget, for example, allocated 
greatly increased amounts to restitution over the coming three-year period: R2.71bn in 2005/06, 
or an increase of 134%, R3.69bn in 2006/07 and R3.83bn in 2007/08 (Umhlaba Wethu, 2005). 
Although it remains unclear whether a higher proportion of claims will be settled with land, signs 
are that the government is intending that that should be the case.  
                                                 




One area of the country in which numerous claims for restitution have been lodged and yet 
remain largely unsettled is in the far north of Limpopo province. The claims have been lodged by 
people (or their descendants) dispossessed from 1913 onwards of their land in the vicinity of the 
Soutpansberg Mountains. Some of the claims refer to land on which white farmers, with far-
reaching assistance from successive whites-only governments, have created profitable, intensive, 
export-oriented farm businesses. A case in point is the group of claims for restitution of land in 
Levubu, an export-oriented agricultural area of around 10 000ha, which employs thousands of 
workers and for which purchases of supplies and equipment contribute to the economies of 
nearby towns such as Makhado and Thohoyandou (see Figure 1). The government has 
recognised the validity of seven claims for restitution in Levubu, Yet it has been hesitant about 
settling them and directly transferring the land to the claimants without attaching far-reaching 
conditions. A major source of the government’s hesitance is the fear that claimants lack the skills 
and know-how to manage the land and maintain commercial, agricultural enterprises.2 
Experience elsewhere in South Africa, including in Limpopo, has shown that direct transfers 
without sufficient ‘post-settlement support’ (Jacobs, 2003; Hall, 2004) can lead to restitution 
failures that are a source of embarrassment to the government as well as a threat to its visions for 
development. The government’s ‘solution’ to this problem in Levubu has been to privatise post-
settlement by brokering deals between agribusinesses and claimants that will lead to fifteen-year 
‘strategic partnerships’. Each of the claimant communities will form a Joint Venture Company 
                                                 
2  Bradstock (2004) noted, for example, that ‘while land reform groups have individuals who have 
worked on white commercial farms the majority of members have no theoretical or practical knowledge 
of farming’ (p.1); that apartheid denied beneficiaries opportunities to attain skills requisite to intensive 
commercial agriculture almost goes without saying. 
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[JVC] with one of two Limpopo-based agribusinesses (hereafter referred to as strategic partners 
[SP]); the JVC will pay an annual lease to its respective community; any profits from the 
managed land will be divided between the SP and the community; and the SP will launch a skills 
transfer plan to ensure that members of the community will have the know-how to take control of 
the land at the end of the fifteen-year period. It is under these conditions that the first 4 000ha or 
so of Levubu farms acquired by the government from ‘willing sellers’ will be managed.3 The 
government has insisted that the land will not be transferred to the claimants if they do not agree 
to enter into partnerships. What is remarkable about the Levubu case, then, is just how far the 
government has gone to impose on the claimants its ideas about how the land should be used. As 
with similar restrictions that have been imposed in other parts of the country on how claimants 
can use transferred land,4 the government is telling the rightful landowners – rightful, that is in 
terms of the liberation ideology of the ANC – what they can and cannot do.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Given this as my point of departure, the aims of this paper are twofold. In the first place I want to 
explain how all this has come about. I position the Levubu case in the wider literature on land 
reform because the process leading up to the Levubu settlement and the underlying tensions it 
                                                 
3  It remains unclear whether the government will acquire the remaining 6,000ha via expropriation. 
There are no indications at the time of writing (January 2006) that the state will exercise its expropriation 
powers. 
4  Claims on national parks, such as the Makuleke claim in Kruger National Park (Ramutsindela, 
2002), have been settled without full transfer of ownership rights. Thus, titles have been transferred under 
strict conditions: some claimants find that ‘they may not sell, mortgage, lease or lend – nor do they have 
unfettered scope to use the land themselves’ (Hall, 2004 p.22). 
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illustrates are emblematic of land questions that continue to rankle in other settler societies in 
Africa (Bernstein, 2002, 2004; Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Peters, 2004), much of Latin America, 
including Brazil (Sauer, 2001; Wolford, 2003), Central America (Kay, 2001; Bobrow-Strain, 
2004), as well as in Asia (Aguilar, 2005; Borras, 2005). Evidence from studies in these places is 
mounting of a change in how states try to address land questions, how, in other words, they 
undertake land reform. According to some, the phase of ‘state-led’ or ‘developmentalist’ 
redistributive land reform has been displaced by a ‘new wave’(Bernstein, 2002), market-friendly 
thrust to land reform exemplified by policies that commit states to pay market-related prices for 
redistributed land, or demand-driven redistribution programmes (Deininger, 1999). The rise of 
this new wave is strongly associated with the ascendancy of neo-liberal approaches in social and 
economic policy more generally. Yet, to some extent, and it bears emphasis, the distinction 
between state-led and market-friendly approaches is a false one. This is because market-friendly 
policies always require extensive state involvement (Jessop, 2002; Harvey, 2005). A more 
accurate characterisation might be that ‘new wave’ policies give more, rather than less, scope to 
market processes (see Borras, 2003, 2005). 
 
It is generally accepted that South Africa has rolled out the World Bank’s neo-liberal ideas about 
using the market more than the state to deal with landlessness (e.g. see Deininger, 1999). 
Attention has been drawn to the South African government’s commitment to protecting private 
property rights and its promise to paying market-related prices for transferred land, hence 
avoiding ‘fast track’ expropriation such as has occurred in Zimbabwe (Lahiff and Cousins, 2001; 
Bernstein, 2004). Of course, completing the restitution programme requires extensive state 
involvement – which, as already noted, in general terms can be said of most programmes 
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affected by neo-liberal principles – and which has led some to argue that the overall land reform 
programme in South Africa is a hybrid case (Levin and Weiner, 1997). However, the way the 
government has acted as the guardian of the interests of the claimants of the Levubu farms and 
imposed far-reaching restrictions on how they can use the land suggests that it has learned to 
move beyond rigid adherence to market-led principles. Thus, although the land has been 
acquired from willing sellers, which reflects the market-led influence, restrictions on how the 
claimants can use the land are nothing if not stentorian. After starting with goals clearly informed 
by neo-liberal principles, then, the South African state seems to have moved in its restitution 
programme towards favouring projects which are not only hybrid in form, but in which the state 
role verges on the authoritarian. It is for this reason that I refer to the restitution ‘solution’ in 
Levubu as a fusion of market- and state-led approaches to the land question in South Africa.  
 
In the second place, I want to show how what has happened can be understood in terms of a 
combination of more global forces and the specificities of South Africa as a place; a place, 
moreover, deeply formed by past struggles. In particular, I draw attention to the happenstance 
coming together of separate forces that have led to the Levubu solution. There is, first, the 
government’s concern about exports, foreign currency earnings as well as its image in the eyes of 
investors and their watchdogs such as credit ratings agencies; in other words, there is the neo-
liberal context to consider, about which much has already been written (Bond, 2000; Cheru, 
2001; Carmody, 2002; Peet, 2002; Miraftab, 2004; Smith, 2004). The government is concerned 
about its image, which is to be expected given the implications of exchange rate fluctuations for 
inflation and its ambitions for economic growth. I argue that all of this leads to a concern about 
avoiding further land reform failures, which in the case of Levubu has led to the government 
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imposing partnerships on the claimants. A second issue refers to conditions more local to South 
Africa. There is, on the one hand, the skills deficit among historically disadvantaged groups that 
the government has inherited from the apartheid era (see Bradstock, 2004 p. 3 for a useful 
discussion) yet with which it must deal in delivering its promises such as restitution. This has 
contributed to the government’s reticence about directly transferring the Levubu farms. Then 
there is the peculiarly South African social position of African traditional leaders with which the 
government has had to deal in restitution. In the case of Levubu, and using materials from 
research with one of the seven claimant communities, I show that the actors leading the claim 
were installed by the now-deceased traditional leader and that, although the leadership’s 
authority has been challenged by some beneficiaries, the government has continued to deal with 
those leaders; that the leaders have supported the partnership plans is not insignificant. Finally, 
there is the position of agribusinesses to consider. Focusing on the Levubu-based partner, I show 
that the relative spatial immobility of their investments in the infrastructure of Levubu has 
compelled them to seek a role after restitution; I also explore some of the dynamics of their role 
and how they stand to gain from the proposed solution, possibly at the expense of the claimant 
communities.  
 
In bringing together these materials, I argue that the Levubu case is emblematic of a learning 
process: ideas imported from outside, from a dominantly market-friendly discourse, have 
undergone considerable transformation in their application as the policies they informed were 
forced to confront the realities of the South African situation, its specificities as a place, more 




The paper is organised as follows. In the first section I provide a brief history of land reform 
practice in South Africa, emphasising the global forces of a discursive nature to which it has 
been subject and the way in which these have been progressively reworked as a result of actual 
experience of applying them. Particular emphasis will be placed on the restitution programme. I 
then examine the Levubu case as an exemplar of these forces and practices. I explain the 
strategic partnership model in Levubu; use materials from research with one of the claimant 
communities to draw attention to their position in the process; and explain the forces behind the 
involvement of white agribusiness.  
 
2. Land Reform in South Africa and the Neo-Liberal Context 
The market-led approach both discursively, according to Bernstein (2002), and as illustrated by 
the bias of World Bank funding for land transfer schemes, has come to prominence in recent 
years; redistributive or state-led land reform has therefore had to take a ‘back seat’ (Feranil, 2005 
p.257) to the ‘new wave’ (Bernstein, 2002) of Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) (Ghimire, 
2001). The MLAR approach ‘emerged out of the pro-market critique of the state-led approach to 
agrarian reform’ (Borras, 2005 p.95; Moyo & Yeros, 2005); it can also be seen as a response to 
new peasant uprisings in Chiapas, to the activities of the Landless Workers Movement (MST) in 
Brazil, or to pre-empt ‘rural sources of social unrest and political disturbance’ (Bernstein, 2002 
p.451).  
 
Proponents of MLAR such as Deininger and Binswanger (1999) have argued that state-led 
policies were, among other things: overly bureaucratic and relied on ‘top-down’ implementation 
methods that disempowered beneficiaries; encouraged rent seeking within bureaucracies; 
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distorted land markets through prohibitions of land sales; relied upon government-led after-care 
or support services; and were supply-driven insofar as the state identified land and then sought 
out beneficiaries. Thus, they have concluded that land reform will be politicised and 
unsuccessful in achieving its goals when the state assumes a leading role.5  
 
In contrast to this, MLAR approaches, ‘accord priority to economic efficiency in the market-
determined allocation of resources’ (El-Ghomeny, 2001 p.107) and hence use very different 
means to effect change in rural areas. Rather than using expropriation of land, for example, 
MLAR advocates voluntary land reform under ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ principles whereby 
landowners are paid full market-related values for land sold. MLAR encourages states to adopt 
‘demand-led’ or ‘demand-driven’ approaches to locate the most determined and ‘fittest’ 
beneficiaries: that is, to ‘the most economically efficient producer’ (Borras, 2005 p.95). Finally, 
MLAR entails a requirement for beneficiaries to develop viable farm business plans before land 
purchase; and cash grants for beneficiaries to acquire private consultancy for farm developments. 
In these key respects, then, MLAR aims to achieve change in rural areas by mobilising the forces 
of the market. Yet it remains to be seen whether MLAR will be successful in its attempt to pre-
empt rural uprisings, or defeat what Moyo and Yeros (2005 p. 24) call the ‘progressive forces’ 
that advocate peasant-led land invasions, such as in Brazil (Petras, 1997; Wolford, 2003), or the 
‘unique offensive against (capitalist) landed property’ (Bernstein, 2005 p.89; emphasis in 
original) such as in Zimbabwe. Moreover, and although MLAR has been ‘rolled out’ in countries 
                                                 
5  As Bobrow-Strain (2004) has noted, however, this separation of the political from the economic 




in Latin America, Africa and Asia, the question arises as to whether states that adopt MLAR 
approaches will stick with them.  
 
In this respect, it is important to recognise that places – countries, regions or locales – have their 
own peculiarities: different histories, spatial arrangements, positions relative to wider flows of 
capital, ideas, or people. Certainly, places are not immune to goings on elsewhere; rarely are they 
entirely isolated, unaffected by changes, shifts, or pressures reaching in from afar (for a far-
reaching discussion of this understanding of Geography see Massey, 2005). It is precisely within 
the context of such an interrupted, interwoven geography that national land reform (or any other) 
policy must be implemented, but necessarily with respect to local conditions that are often 
deeply sedimented historically. We should not be surprised, then, if policies and practices, 
enjoying some wider resonance and implementation, are mutated, shaped, even abandoned given 
the wide range of both obstacles and opportunities that can arise in particular countries, or 
regions.   
 
This is indeed the picture that seems to be taking shape in South Africa, which initially embraced 
the new market-led approach to land reform – at the advice of the World Bank (Van Zyl et al, 
2000; Bond, 2000; Lahiff, 2001; Hall, 2003) – along with numerous other policies of a neo-
liberal slant (Bond, 2000; Cheru, 2001; Carmody, 2002; Peet, 2002; Miraftab, 2004; Smith, 
2004). Embracing the market-led approach led to adoption of a willing-seller, willing-buyer 
approach to land acquisition, which protects the private property rights of landowners and 
commits the state to using the market to acquire land for delivery on its promises (Zimmerman, 
2000; Lahiff, 2001; Kepe & Cousins, 2002). According to Deininger (1999), adoption of the 
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principle, “was based on the need to maintain public confidence in the land market, and more 
generally to affirm the government’s respect for individual property rights” (Deininger, 1999, 
p.665). The need for such ‘respect’ for private property was a major concern of the white 
minority during the transition from apartheid to democracy, a concern which is ongoing. This 
sensitivity continues and has been intensified as a result of the way in which neighbouring 
Zimbabwe rejected the neo-liberal approach in favour of a “fast track” (Bernstein, 2004) 
expropriation of white-owned land.  
 
Consider now the restitution programme, which provides for the restitution of land rights to 
persons or communities dispossessed of them after 19 June 1913, and in terms of a racially 
discriminatory law or practice (Lahiff, 2001; Ramutsindela, 2002; Hall, 2004). Its legal basis is 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22/1994.6 The Act provides five forms of restitution: 
restoration of original land; provision of alternative land; financial compensation; provision of 
alternative relief; and/or priority access to other government programmes. By March 2004, there 
were 79 693 claims for restitution (Umhlaba Wethu, 2005). According to Hall (2003 p.25), 
‘between 20% and 25%’ are rural claims. These are ‘large group claims involving hundreds, if 
not thousands, of people’ (ibid.); they are clustered in Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-
Natal (Hall, 2004 p.15). Yet,  ‘while fewer in number, the rural claims account for the bulk of the 
restitution programme, since these represent the majority of the people claiming restitution and 
                                                 
6  The Act established a Land Claims Court to adjudicate contested claims in 1996. The Court has 
the same status as a High Court; hence appeals against its judgment are made to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal or, in exceptional circumstances, to the Constitutional Court. All claims for restitution had to be 
lodged with the Commission for Restitution of Land Rights by the end of 1998. The Commission is 
responsible for investigating claims and preparing them for settlement or adjudication. Regional 
Commissions were formed in 1999.  
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will probably also account for most of the cost’ (Hall, 2004 p.16). By mid 2004, around 9,000 
rural claims remained unsettled and only six per cent of those settled involved transferring land 
(ibid.). Not surprisingly, the government has been criticised for its slow pace in completing the 
restitution programme. In explaining this, attention has focused on the budget for land reform, 
which in 2001, for example, was only 0.38 per cent of the National Budget, equivalent to the 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (Walker, 2003 p.17). The problems of 
such a small budget were heightened by the fact that current owners have to be compensated; 
that restitution has been carried out, in other words, under the constraints of the willing-seller 
principle. It is notable, then, that the allocation for restitution from the 2005 National Budget, 
which was 1.18 per cent of the National Budget, has increased significantly from what has been 
allocated in the past.  
 
Although restitution requires considerable state involvement – the adjudication process, claim 
processing, buying the land, etc. – and can therefore be understood as a more hybrid type of land 
reform policy than the government’s other programmes, especially redistribution, it nevertheless 
has been underpinned by the market-led approach. This is because systems for land acquisition 
initially relied on the state acquiring land from willing-sellers. However, the slant of restitution 
towards the market has changed as the state has learned about the various shortcomings of its 
policy.  
 
First, the state has acquired expropriation powers via the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment 
Act 48 of 2003. Not surprisingly, perhaps, given the high profile given to expropriations in 
Zimbabwe, the amendment generated debate about the ‘potential for abuse of this power by the 
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Minister and possible impact of expropriations on investor confidence’ (Hall, 2004 p.20). Indeed, 
when the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs exercised these new powers in 2004, it 
attracted a fair amount of attention from the international media (e.g. BBC News, 2005). Yet, in 
some restitution cases, such as Limpopo, where ‘nearly wall-to-wall claims [cover] much of the 
province’s prime agricultural land like Levubu, Waterberg, and Tzaneen’ (Hall, 2004 p.21), the 
new powers may have to be exercised to complete the restitution programme against the wishes 
of landowners who refuse to sell. In short, the state has learned that its commitment to the 
willing-seller, willing-buyer principle is a major stumbling block. 
 
Second, the state has begun to impose conditions on how claimants can use their land. One 
aspect here is the government’s determination that claimants do not sell transferred land. It has 
therefore imposed restrictions on using the land as collateral for loan capital. While this means 
they will have difficulty finding money to invest in new machinery or irrigation works, or indeed 
to have sufficient working capital, it also protects beneficiaries from the possibility of losing the 
land in the future. An important dimension of this stance is the desire on the behalf of the 
government to nurture black farmers: that is, land restitution is one way to alter the racial 
distribution of land in South Africa; given that the most likely buyers of restituted land would be 
whites, sale or foreclosure is not something the government is anxious to facilitate.  
 
Finally, the state has altered its approach towards issues of post-settlement assistance. Although 
only 185 claims had been settled with land transfers as at March 2003 (Hall, 2003), there were 
already indications by that time that some beneficiaries were failing to maintain agricultural 
production. Cases began to emerge of what, from the standpoint of earlier uses of the land can 
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only be described as regression: failures to maintain yields, abandonment of property, looting of 
the equipment for want of the capital to put it to work, among other things. An example of this is 
the Mamathola land claim, near Tzaneen in Limpopo, which resulted in the transfer in 2001 of 1 
400ha at a cost to government of R43m. The land was highly developed, and had been operated 
as a commercial farm enterprise; production began to collapse almost immediately after the hand 
over. A State Attorney eventually required the government to assume management of the farms 
in 2003. Although the government blamed the community leadership for the failure, critics of the 
government’s approach to land reform – including some in the white farming community (Du 
Toit, 2004) – have used the case to draw attention to ineffective government support to 
restitution beneficiaries. Such deteriorations in productivity suggest that, where restitution 
restores commercial agricultural land, beneficiaries require extensive skills – ranging from 
technical and legal to procurement and marketing – that farmers had but which many 
beneficiaries had been denied the opportunity to acquire. This has bolstered arguments for a 
degree of post-settlement assistance far beyond what was initially on offer.7  
 
In the context of neo-liberalism, it is not entirely surprising that the government has opted for a 
private solution. Of course, the most private solution is to give the land to the beneficiaries and 
have them decide how to handle it; however the government is increasingly opting to shift 
responsibility to the private sector.8 A model for such an approach emerged in 2003 in the 
                                                 
7  This issue had already widely noted by observers of land reform. Hall (2003), for example, 
identified three important areas for better post-settlement support: institutional support for the legal 
entities taking on ownership of the restituted land, support for agricultural production, and assistance to 
enable beneficiaries to access municipal services on restituted land. 
8  Evidence from elsewhere in South Africa confirms the government’s willingness to have land 
reform beneficiaries work in partnership with the private sector (Mayson, 2003). 
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(former homeland-owned) Zebediela Citrus Estate, Limpopo. Zebediela was taken over by the 
Agricultural and Rural Development Corporation (ARDC), which was formed in 1996 to oversee 
the management and restructuring of former homeland assets, farms, and estates. Yet, according 
to Shaker (2003 p.3) “financial, technical and managerial weakness” in the ARDC meant that it 
required an R70m annual government subsidy. When this was withdrawn from the National 
Budget, the ARDC was forced to sell or restructure assets. In the case of Zebediela, the Bjathladi 
community had a restitution claim, which the Limpopo Land Claims Commission recognised. 
The need to restore the land and to restructure the asset led the provincial Department of 
Agriculture and the Land Claims Commission to agree to transfer the asset to the beneficiaries 
but under the proviso that a ‘strategic partner’ would manage the land. The arrangement in 
Zebediela is as follows: There is a management board on which representatives of the workforce, 
the landowners, and the partner sit (the government is also represented on the board, although 
without voting rights). The partner signed a lease agreement for fifteen years and pays an annual 
rent to the landowners. Profits are shared between the landowners, the workers and the partner 
according to the following formula: partner: fifty per cent; landowner: thirty-five per cent; 
workforce: fifteen per cent. In return for the higher share, the partner provides working capital 
for the enterprise, a management team and commits to providing accredited training to the 
landowners and workers, so enabling some of them to assume management of the estate at the 
end of the lease agreement. 9 
                                                 
9  It has to be pointed out that, while Shaker (2003) does not identify the strategic partner, the 
Financial Mail (October 2004) claims it is the Boyes family group. However, a black economic 
empowerment (BEE) company, South African Farm Management (SAFM) was identified as the partner 
when I visited the estate in 2004. The relationship between the Boyes group and SAFM is not exactly 
clear: according to one member of SAFM’s board, the Boyes group is only an ‘investor’ in SAFM; yet 




What we see, then, is that South Africa’s land restitution policy – which was and remains 
influenced by market-led approaches – has begun to shift towards a more vigorously 
interventionist stance. There is the shift towards expropriation to consider, as well as the 
government’s stance of imposing new forms of post-settlement assistance on land reform 
beneficiaries. It has therefore encouraged and, in some cases, compelled beneficiaries to 
establish partnerships with private consultants or agribusinesses. It is to a fuller discussion of 
these issues as they have been played out in the Levubu case that the paper now turns. 
 
3. The Case of Levubu 
The area known as Levubu is located on the southern piedmont of the Soutpansberg Mountains 
between Makhado and Thohoyandou. The restitution claims refer to removals in the late 1930s. 
The Union of South Africa displaced thousands of Africans from the area to make way for an 
irrigation scheme for the settlement of poor whites. The claimants consist of seven communities. 
They have used archival and oral evidence about the dispossessions to support their claims. The 
sub-tropical climate in Levubu is ideal for the commercial farming of mango, avocado, banana 
and macadamia nuts. Around two hundred whites own the farms. Although many of them 
dispute the restitution claims and refuse to sell their farms, a group of fifty farmers did agree and 
this has led to the first group of purchases, which means that the remaining farms – owned by the 
group who refuse to sell – may have to be expropriated to complete the restitution process in the 
area.  
                                                                                                                                                             
economic empowerment front for the Boyes group. Adding to the confusion, a government official told 
me in an interview that SAFM consisted of ‘comrades’ (Interview with official from Limpopo Land 




My research on the restitution issue in Levubu involved thirty semi-structured interviews with 
white farmers. Some of them had agreed to sell, while others were refusing. One group of 
farmers, in particular, was positioned to become a strategic partner with some of the claimants. I 
conducted five interviews with one member of this group. Wherever possible, I tried to 
triangulate information gathered from these interviews. I also conducted research with members 
of two of the communities claiming land in Levubu. This included interviews with community 
leaders10. I focused most intently on interviews with members of the Ravele Land Claims 
Committee as well as ordinary Ravele beneficiaries. I conducted a total of forty interviews with 
beneficiaries in their homes to learn what they knew about the process, what they believed would 
happen with their land, what they would like to happen with their land, and how they believed 
they could influence the process.11 Finally, my research included semi-structured interviews 
about the Levubu land claims with numerous government officials, including with the Limpopo 
Land Claims Commissioner.  
 
3.1 Imposing the Levubu ‘solution’ 
The research revealed that the restituted land will be transferred under the following restrictions. 
First and foremost, and because of the value of the land and its commercial use, the beneficiaries 
cannot re-settle it. This condition is not unique to Levubu; according to one government official, 
                                                 
10  This includes community structures such as the Civic Association, the Tribal Council and faith-
based groups. 
11  Talking about restitution was a sensitive matter. There were countless rumours about who was 
really going to benefit from the land claims: some said that traditional leaders would keep the benefits for 
themselves; others accused their respective land claims committees of withholding information with a 
view to controlling the transferred land for their own personal benefit.  
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only ‘where farms aren’t commercially viable, people can re-settle’ (Personal Interview with 
official from Limpopo Land Claims Commission, September 2004; my emphasis). It must be 
stressed that this is a major imposition on the claimants, many of whom do not have sufficient 
access to land and who would like to farm the land there. 
 
Second, the government has disallowed the communities to have the land restored and then lease 
it back to the white farmers, an option many (if not all) of the farmers favoured and which many 
said was the reason they had agreed to sell. On this issue, one government official said: 
 
As a Province we do not overwhelmingly receive this [sic]. This thing of leasing back 
cannot be a leasing back and left at that. Some of the farmers are proposing is that, “You 
buy my land, you give me $10m. I take it and put it in my bank and pay all my debts.” 
And then I come back and say, “Ok, I want to lease this land and just continue making 
money, right? I’m not going to train your guys so one day you can come and run it.” 
Actually you have not changed anything. You are creating perpetual dependence. The 
community just gets rental at the end of the month. (Personal Interview with official from 
Limpopo Land Claims Commission, October 2004). 
 
Third, then, the claimants must accept a strategic partner to manage their land. One member of a 
Land Claims Committee stated that, ‘Dr. Motsoaledi [then provincial political head of the 
Department of Agriculture] made it clear that, “if you want the land to be returned, you must 
agree to take on board a strategic partner.” You see, this is the government’s plan.’ (Personal 




The specific arrangements in Levubu are similar to the model used in Zebediela (Shaker, 2003), 
although there will be two strategic partners (SP) working with the beneficiaries in Levubu. The 
beneficiaries, who enter into a Joint Venture Company (JVC) with one of the agribusinesses, 
receive an annual lease payment for use of the land. They also share the profits with the SP. 
Because the beneficiaries cannot raise capital on their own given the constraints on using the 
land as collateral for loans, the SP provides working capital. One government official sought to 
give this a more positive slant by emphasizing that having the partner bring working capital 
would mean that: 
 
He will make sure it does not go down, unlike where he has leveraged the land and where 
the farm goes down the bank takes the land, which was a policy decision of this 
government. We cannot afford it, otherwise we’ll have a situation where we give land, 
the bank takes it, and sells it to a white landowner. (Personal Interview with official from 
Limpopo Land Claims Commission, October 2004) 
 
The Levubu settlement also includes a skills transfer plan, which is intended to enable 
beneficiaries to take full control of the farm enterprises at the end of the fifteen-year lease period. 
The intention is to create a new group of black farmers in Levubu, one that will potentially 
highlight the benefits of the government’s land reform programme.12 This has a strong 
                                                 
12  Importantly, both partners pitched their operations to the government as consisting of black 
partners as per the government’s concern that land reform comply with its black economic empowerment 
intentions. As I have already noted with regards to SAFM and as appears to be the case with the other 
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empowerment element because, as one official stated, the government task is to be ‘a catalyst for 
change and transformation’ (my emphasis), and the skills transfer plan is central to achieving 
this goal. In short, the emphasis on training claimants to farm underlines the developmental goals 
of the government and its distancing from a more market-led process. The government does not 
just want to insert the claimants as landlords; it wants to develop them.  
 
Adoption of the partnership approach evidently reflects the government’s experience of high-
profile cases of restitution failures in other parts of South Africa. Indeed, officials explained the 
government’s position with respect to the Levubu case through reference to these failures. 
Collapse of the restituted farms at Mamathola, for example, clearly led the Limpopo Land 
Claims Commission, along with the Department of Agriculture, to look for alternative ways to 
provide post-settlement support. One official noted that: 
 
The assumption was communities are ready; communities want to become commercial 
farmers. Nobody really thought about the post-settlement implications of what we were 
doing, nobody. And then finally when Mamathola happened, fortunately for us this 
happened, everybody started to say, “Hey, we need post-settlement support.” We can’t 
hand back highly commercial farms to communities and expect them to survive on their 
own. (Personal Interview with official from Limpopo Land Claims Commission, 
September 2004). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
partner, the financial backing and leadership positions of these companies is white, not black; this does 
not mean, however, that either company is not serious about BEE. 
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There is, therefore, some empirical basis for the government’s reluctance to opt for direct 
transfer given that ‘the claimant cannot come on and expect to run the farm in a day’ (Personal 
Interview with official from Limpopo Land Claims Commission, October 2004). And rather than 
allowing claimants to re-settle the land or have them lease the land to other farmers, the 
government opted for privatised post-settlement because, ‘we believe that it’s not only [about 
returning the] land, [the partnership plan is] a long process, maybe fifteen years, maybe twenty 
years, but it has to happen and it has to happen this way […] we really want it to be a private 
deal’ (Personal Interview with official from Limpopo Land Claims Commission, October 2004; 
my emphasis).  
 
The partnership arrangement can therefore be viewed as a form of privatised post-settlement 
support that minimises the need for government-provided support but which also places severe 
limitations on how the rightful landowners can use their land. It reflects the learning process 
through which land restitution practice has moved – from a stance of favouring direct transfer to 
imposing restrictions on communities – as well as the government’s desire to minimise what it 
needs to spend. In this sense, the tensions of national finances in the context of neo-liberalism 
reach into Levubu. 
 
Yet, despite the way the government has imposed its vision for restitution in Levubu, the balance 
of political forces has been such as to facilitate its implementation. Not only have they been able 
to obtain the support of the communities involved, partly through the ability of African elites to 
control the whole negotiations process (possibly with a view to side payments to themselves for 
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their trouble); but in addition the calculations of white agribusiness have also lent impetus to the 
feasibility of the plan.   
  
3.2 The claimants 
Turning to the communities, a key issue is the role of traditional leaders. As has been noted 
elsewhere (e.g. Rangan and Gilmartin, 2002; Claassens, 2001), the post-apartheid government 
has not sufficiently challenged traditional authorities in the former homelands and Bantustans. 
According to Rangan and Gilmartin (2002 p.639), traditional leaders: ‘retain powers to control 
spaces in de facto homelands’; mostly ‘function on the principle of hereditary rule’; and exercise 
‘traditional customary law in former Bantustan areas.’ Thus, while the Constitution of South 
Africa has abolished homelands, enshrines a Bill of Rights, and accords equal rights to women 
and men, the situation in the former homelands and Bantustans highlights contradictions in the 
constitution. The continued strength of traditional leaders has meant that, in land reform in 
general, and restitution in particular, the government has had to reconcile its determination to 
transfer land with the presence of traditional authorities that have the potential to undermine the 
egalitarian character of land reform.  
 
In investigating restitution of land rights in Levubu, one area of focus for my research was the 
internal dynamics of the claimant communities, especially in regards to the role of traditional 
leaders. I use here materials from research on the Ravele beneficiaries, whose ancestors were 
displaced from their land in Levubu in the late 1930s. They were ‘granted’ land by the Union of 
South Africa in present-day Mauluma, 20km from Levubu. Today, the village has around 5 000 
inhabitants. Many are not members of the restitution claimant community; furthermore, only 
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twenty-two percent of the registered beneficiaries reside in Mauluma.13 The late Ravele 
traditional leader was a politician in the former Venda Bantustan. Before he died, he created a 
Land Claims Committee and appointed its leaders. They remain in their position of power to this 
day; even the new traditional leader has not been able to replace them. Not surprisingly, given all 
of the meetings the leaders have attended with government officials, non-governmental 
organisations, and the strategic partners, the leadership of the Ravele beneficiaries has acquired 
considerable knowledge of the claim, the legal and procedural process, and on how the land will 
be used under the terms of the partnership.  
 
Yet numerous beneficiaries claimed the leadership had not been forthcoming with information 
about the claim. Mauluma has structures that the Land Claims Committee arguably should have 
kept informed on what was happening with the claim. Khoro (Tribal or Village Council), for 
example, meets in Mauluma every two weeks. Although not everyone living in Mauluma is a 
Ravele beneficiary and neither do all the beneficiaries live there, Khoro presented a regular 
opportunity for the committee to keep people informed. According to numerous beneficiaries, 
however, it refused to do so. Indeed, when I asked about this, one leading member of the 
committee stated that ‘you see, in terms of the [Restitution of Land Rights] Act, the Land Claims 
Committee must report to the beneficiaries; Khoro is not a structure we must report to’ (Personal 
Interview, March 2005; respondent’s emphasis). 
 
                                                 
13  The land claims committee claimed this number was an under-estimate. They said many of the 
inhabitants of Mauluma should have but did not sign up as beneficiaries because they believed by 
registering they would have to move back to the land. Space does not allow me to discuss here why so 




Others among the beneficiaries believed the Land Claims Committee had deliberately guarded 
their positions. One beneficiary even went so far as to claim that,  
 
People are not as aware of what is going on as they should be and I think this is more by 
design. It is not accidental that people are not aware. […] It’s by design. As you are 
aware, the people on the Land Claims Committee […] derive their convictions on the 
point that says, ‘we have been involved in this process since as early as 1996’. They 
regard themselves as custodians of the process. They don’t believe that anybody else 
deserves to know more than they know. They believe they have got the right to decide 
what other people should know and shouldn’t know and, for them, anybody else who gets 
to know anything about the process, for them, it’s a privilege. (Personal Interview, May 
2005). 
 
It was not clear why the leadership was so intent on maintaining this sort of secrecy. It is not 
inconceivable that they had the best interests of the beneficiaries in mind; nor, however, is it too 
extreme to suggest that they intended to make personal gains. Indeed, the latter possibility was 
most commonly raised by beneficiaries. They certainly are well positioned to gain as a result of 
holding positions on the Board of Directors of the Joint Venture Company, especially if those 
positions are remunerated; even if they are not, whomever fills those positions will have 
privileged knowledge of the situation. Another possibility is that the leadership wants to control 
the legal entity that will oversee how income from the land will be spent. Indeed, income from 
the land, via the annual lease payment and shares from the farm-based profits, may turn out to be 




Although the research cannot determine exactly what the leaders intend to do with the 
knowledge and power they have accumulated, it is clear that they were major supporters of the 
strategic partnership approach. This seems to have a lot to do with why the government’s 
imposition of the partnerships did not experience anywhere near the level of resistance one might 
expect given that the government is telling the beneficiaries how they can use their land. Further, 
though the leadership was supportive of the partnership proposals, interviews with ordinary 
beneficiaries revealed not only a lack of knowledge about the land claim – among numerous 
other things, they did not know the number of farms that would be transferred, the potential 
strategic partners with whom the government was determined they would have to work, or 
whether beneficiaries would be allowed to have their own portion of land – but also an 
acknowledgement that they had had negligible influence on how the claim had progressed. 
Again, understanding why beneficiaries were so unaware of what was going on and why they 
had seemingly been excluded from the process was not easy. Among other things, leaders of the 
Land Claims Committee said that ‘the people do not understand this process; all they want is for 
us to tell them when we will get the land back’ (Personal Interview, March 2005). Yet it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the beneficiaries had been deliberately kept in the dark by the 
leadership.  
 
Thus, despite government claims that restituted land will be returned to democratically elected 
and organised legal entities such as Communal Property Associations or Trusts, evidence from 
my research with the Ravele beneficiaries suggests otherwise and draws attention to the 
government’s seeming indifference to the issue of community democracy. Indeed, the 
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government was continuing to negotiate and meet with members of a Land Claims Committee 
that was not democratically elected and was suspected by the beneficiaries of pursuing personal 
gain. I argue that this helps to explain the acquiescence of the Ravele beneficiaries to the 
government’s plans for the restituted land. The Levubu solution has turned out to be partly a deal 
between a small and un-representative group of community leaders and the government. The 
other party involved were the two agribusinesses that emerged as partners during 2004. It is to 
the partners that I now turn.   
 
3.3 The strategic partners 
The beneficiary communities are only part of the equation which has made this odd hybrid 
arrangement politically feasible. There is also the interest of the white agribusiness. One of the 
two agribusinesses involved, Mavu Management Systems, consists of white farmers from 
Levubu and the surrounding area.14 They own upstream agricultural suppliers, downstream 
processing facilities (nut drying and hulling, juice processing), and have marketing channels to 
domestic and foreign buyers. The MMS farmers stated that they believed restitution via direct 
transfer of land to the beneficiaries would place their fixed up- and downstream investments, 
which have been developed since the 1980s, at risk. This is because they shared with the 
government the view that the beneficiaries would not be able to farm the land adequately. This 
would place the supply of high quality raw materials to their processing facilities and marketing 
operations in jeopardy. One possible strategy, which the MMS farmers, in common with most of 
the farmers in Levubu, had favoured, had been to lease back the land from the claimants; as 
noted, however, the government was opposed to this. Entering into partnership arrangements 
                                                 
14  My research was most closely involved with MMS; representatives from the other partner, 
SAFM, were not as willing to discuss their role in Levubu.  
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with the claimant communities was therefore the only way for the MMS farmers to ensure their 
raw material supply. As one of the farmers in MMS noted, ‘the best way to [secure your raw 
material base] is to farm it yourself’. He continued thus: 
 
Look, to be honest, if I didn’t have my investment in the factories I wouldn’t have been a 
strategic partner. […] I would have been out of here. […] Remember, a factory, if your 
raw material basis is not secure, it’s actually just a heap of stainless steel. 
 
There were other concerns. The other potential strategic partner, SAFM, was positioning itself to 
manage the Levubu farms. MMS therefore had another incentive to get involved: ‘My factory 
processes the stuff. If [another partner] takes over the whole 10 000ha [in Levubu] and takes 
over my raw material base, then I’m actually in dire straits, right?’ If ensuring future supplies of 
raw materials was the primary incentive for MMS, another concern was the overall commercial 
viability of Levubu. The farmers in MMS own upstream facilities – nurseries and a supply 
company – the future profitability of which depends on a vibrant agricultural economy in 
Levubu. And there is also the issue of the time and energy expended in establishing markets, 
both in South Africa and overseas, which would show limited return if restitution in Levubu was 
to be a failure.  
 
So there were necessities impelling them in the direction of performing the role that the 
government has been looking to them to perform. There were also conditions of a more 
facilitative sort regarding the transition process between individual private ownership and the 
partnership arrangement. Hugely important here is that under South African labour law, they are 
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going to be able to draw on the knowledge of existing workers on the land to be restituted. This 
knowledge is important because, as another farmer noted, the transition from one owner to the 
next can be problematic: 
 
This farm we took over: It took me days to actually discover the irrigation system. When 
we bought the farm, the grass was this high, I cut the grass and I said, “ok, he has 
irrigation” – small sprinklers next to the trees – and I said, “ok, if he’s got irrigation, he 
must have a main line and a valve.” And I took all six of my people and asked them to 
look around for a valve and it took me a week’s chopping down of trees and there wasn’t 
one because it wasn’t connected… You don’t take over a farm and run it. If you take over 
this farm, you’re not going to run it like I’ve been running it. It’s going to take you at 
least 12 months to get yourself stationed. (Personal Interview, October 2004). 
  
But the farm workers are critical in another sense. Not only are they a source of knowledge, if 
MMS can alter the organisational structure and the division of labour on the farms, then that can 
enable a radical reduction in the costs of the overall operation. One farmer in MMS commented 
on this aspect:  
 
…you must look at how people have farmed up till now in South Africa… you had a 
white farm owner and a black, traditionally what you call a “boss boy”. And he was 
actually doing most of the work. It’s going to be a three-year phasing in where you have 
to change these guys, these black farm managers. Because even though they have done 
the work, they didn’t assume responsibility. You have to get them to a point where they 
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assume responsibility. Like my farm managers: they’re all black. Ok. They run their 
farms as if it’s their own property. They assume full management responsibilities. They 
know exactly what the cost impacts of each decision is (sic.) and they know how it 
impacts on their incentive bonus at the end of the year. Now that system is not in place in 
Levubu, under the traditional system. But the people are there. And I don’t think those 
people are different from my people … you have to go in and change their mindsets. The 
technical expertise is there. They’re on the farms. So it’s a question of managing those 
guys and integrating the different management philosophies.  
 
It is significant – from the perspective of understanding the coming together of various 
contingencies of South Africa as a place – that the MMS farmers are in position to draw on this 
expertise owing to the protections of recent South African farm labour legislation. For example, 
The Agricultural Labour Act 147/1993 and Labour Relations Act 66/1995 both provide 
protection for farm workers, which MMS is likely to exploit and which will help the partners 
achieve a smooth transition. This is especially the case given that the beneficiaries may expect 
jobs to become available on what, after all, will be their land. The labour laws, however, will 
enable the partners to resist any calls for widespread redeployment of workers. For sure, 
members of the beneficiary communities will eventually replace these workers and farm 
managers. But as, with not a little relief, one of the MMS farmers explained it:  
 
…you’ve got labour laws in South Africa, which make it practically impossible to 
dismiss them [the current workforce], which I’m so glad about! So, yes, through normal 
attrition, definitely, in ten years, you train a new class of managers. It makes absolute 
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sense [but] If you want to dismiss a farm manager of 20 years experience, and you have 
to pay him one week for every year of service, and you want to dismiss a few thousand 
people, then you’re looking at a serious pain.  
 
Thus, the calculation of MMS to become a partner encompasses a wide range of aspects, from 
the need to secure a supply of raw materials so that returns on earlier, long-lasting investments 
can be achieved, to ensuring that problems in the transitional period are minimised. And add to 
the attractions of the scheme, the agribusinesses will be, courtesy of land restitution, making 
gains from far more land than they ever controlled before restitution. So despite the risks and 
challenges ahead for a partner such as MMS, if the post-restitution environment is negotiated 
effectively, a large windfall may be in the offing:  
 
Where in the whole wide world will somebody come and buy your assets from you and 
then give it back to you at no cost plus 50% of the share back to you? Where will that 
happen? And that’s what’s happening in Levubu. And they’re not only buying my assets, 
they’re giving me three times more, four, five times more assets. They’re going to spend 
R231m and basically give 50% of R150m to MMS. Where in the world will you get that 
asset base for basically nothing? What’s your investment? Your working capital? 
Where’s your exposure?  
 
4. Discussion and conclusions  
The Levubu ‘solution’ draws attention to a hybrid approach to restitution. Consider how the 
government acquired land for restitution in Levubu: reflecting the influence of market-led 
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approaches, it has not used expropriation in the process of land acquisition; rather, it has relied 
on the willing-seller, willing-buyer principle. In Levubu, this has led fifty-one farmers to agree to 
sell.15  Yet, while the approach to land acquisition reflects the market-led approach, the way in 
which the government has sought to transfer land is certainly not. The state has imposed far-
reaching restrictions on how the beneficiaries can use the land; restrictions that, as a model for 
restitution on commercial agricultural land of this type, have not been tested elsewhere in South 
Africa. By so doing, it has acted as the ‘guardian’ (Bernstein, 2002) of the beneficiaries’ 
interests. This aspect highlights more developmentalist or state-led approaches to land reform. In 
my view, therefore, restitution in Levubu is a fusion of these two ways to address land questions.  
 
I argue that this fusion can only be understood in terms of the geo-historical context of South 
Africa as a place. For example, plans such as those in Levubu are closely bound up with the 
South African state’s wariness about its foreign currency earnings, the rate of exchange and 
inflation targeting, which is ‘the anchor of monetary policy in South Africa’ (Business Day, 
November 8 2005). Furthermore, precisely how South Africa’s approach to land reform is 
viewed by international observers, including not just potential inward investors but also the all-
important credit rating agencies, has inserted an element of discipline on the state, which helps to 
                                                 
15  Admittedly, the government has not had the degree of success it would have perhaps anticipated. 
In Levubu, as in other parts of South Africa, many landowners still refuse to sell. What has happened 
elsewhere, therefore, is that the state has begun to expropriate land. When I interviewed a government 
official in Limpopo with responsibility for land reform and asked about the farmers who refuse to sell for 
restitution purposes, the official noted that, ‘we will declare disputes with [those who refuse to sell] and 
we will expropriate. [There is] No other route. We will expropriate.’ (Personal Interview with official 




explain why it has been reluctant to use its expropriation powers; events north of the Limpopo 
River in Zimbabwe in particular have shown to outsiders the perils of expropriation and it seems 
fair to say that South Africa has been wary of taking such an approach. I also argue that the 
interest of international observers extends to how the government deals with restitution in areas 
such as Levubu. High-profile failures, with tours to the struggling farms for visiting foreign 
journalists, organised by the local white farmers, would not look good for the government’s 
image. In these ways, then, the national state is caught up in a neo-liberal bind from which it 
cannot easily escape and which influences the way policy is implemented on the ground. Clearly, 
then, the Levubu ‘solution’ has also emerged from the experience of implementing land reform 
policy and, in particular, the ‘reality’ that beneficiaries cannot achieve success without extensive 
support. This is as much a part of the apartheid inheritance as the land question itself.  
 
Finally, there is the disposition of political forces around the Levubu case. This includes the 
acquiescence of the claimants and the interest of white agribusiness. As I have discussed, the 
former aspect is closely related to the authority of traditional leaders and how leaders among the 
claimants have guarded their positions, restricted the flow of information, possibly with a view to 
personal gain. The latter was driven by considerations of both potential losses and also potential 
gains. There is the issue of securing access to a certain quality and quantity of raw material and 
the prospect of the government buying assets and then effectively returning them to MMS. 
Furthermore, the contingent role played by South Africa labour legislation – which holds out the 
prospect of a smooth transition and the possibility of restructuring labour costs on the farm 




An unanswered and important question about use of strategic partnerships is that, while they are 
touted by government officials as a pathway to success, how things will work out is actually a 
good deal more uncertain.  A particular concern is that over re-investment. Given the fifteen-year 
time horizon for the partnership, how seriously will the strategic partner push reinvestment of 
earnings in the project, particularly if there is pressure from the community to spend the profits 
instead on upgrading community infrastructure, bursaries, and the other things that have been 
mentioned.. One large-scale, export-oriented farmer commented on this aspect:   
 
Let’s say I become a strategic partner and the term is fifteen years, how do you think this 
farm is going to look right in fifteen years? […] I mean, there’s a big difference between 
return on investment and profit. I can go to a very high profit point very quickly… if I’m 
an interim partner I will go for the profit margin…I mean, it takes seven years for a citrus 
tree to come into full production. Do you think I’m going to plant new trees? No, I’m 
going to go for the profit margin, it’s as simple as that… Ownership means return on 
investment, not profit. I mean, I came here and up until today, this company has never 
paid a dividend, we’ve ploughed back every cent. We draw salaries, we all draw salaries, 
but we have never paid a dividend…That’s the principle of what I’m talking about. So if 
the owner hasn’t got the drive, don’t think that your manager is going to have it. I mean, 
you appoint a manager, they always say, ‘What is the bonus system?’ And the bonus 





I asked a government official involved in the Levubu restitution claim about the issue of 
sincerity, re-investment, and whether the government will intervene to ensure partners do not 
take advantage of the beneficiaries.  
 
Official: You [the partner] have to give us a deal to say what is your expansion plan. 
What is your investment plan? At the same time, you have got the claimant 
communities, the workers and the SP and government as an overseer, a representative 
of government who’d on a daily basis be part of the process… 
 
AF: But that’s going to depend on how sharp is that person. 
 
O: Yeah, obviously, the idea is that person is not necessarily an individual. He’s there 
representing an institution. If needs be, if we need to get somebody else in, if you think 
that this guy is not giving proper fertilisation to the roots then we can get the relevant 
government structure to investigate because this man is reaping these plants and the 
next five years he is going to leave and you have to re-plant everything.  
 
AF: But what is the penalty? How does the government exert discipline?  
 
O: Well, those are the things that are being worked on. […]But in the end, it’s a very big 
challenge if a guy tries to play fun and games and in a SP arrangement we have to 
accommodate for that. It becomes a private issue but we hope in the line that we have 
structured it will be a success. I think we are going to have to learn to work with the SPs. 
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We are learning, we are looking at how they are doing. I think if production is going well, 
everyone will be excited and happy. But the real truth will come if things start to go down. 
Then you will see the true colours of everyone! But the taste of the pudding is in the eating 
and we are currently trying to eat it and see how does it taste.  
 
Despite this official’s confidence that the government will be able to monitor the Levubu case 
effectively, it obviously remains to be seen how successful it will be. On the other hand, one of 
the strategic partners has a stake in the area in the form of facilities whose future commercial 
viability depends on making the project a success over a longer term period than the fifteen 
years. Government, too, has a stake in securing employment on the farms and maintaining 
exports; and, of course, the beneficiaries have a major stake, albeit one that they may be tempted 
to trade off against consumption.  Moreover, the large amounts of money involved could lead to 
disputes. Some of the better positioned could stand to secure significant personal gains. There are 
also challenges ahead relative to monitoring the activities of partners, ensuring they truthfully 
state financial earnings, not manipulating accounts, buying over-priced inputs, or selling output 
at under-market rates. For communities that obviously suffered from dispossession and then 
under apartheid, restitution promises to bring much-needed money. Yet precisely who will 
control the money that will come from the land is not clear. Some, but by no means all, 
community members monitored the land claim closely and appeared to be jockeying for position 
to influence how income from the land would be spent. Others seemed resigned to the fact they 




What the strategic partnership approach certainly generates is a new and important social 
structure among the Ravele beneficiaries, the Communal Property Association, which will have 
the potential to create enduring changes in Mauluma. For example, the Ravele Land Claims 
Committee stressed that income from the land would be used to ‘develop’ Mauluma: that is, to 
improve schools in the village, lay a new road surface, and possibly to build new sports facilities. 
Future research will be needed to assess what, if anything, the beneficiaries have gained from 
this approach to restitution; and to examine how the CPA, a new and potentially wealthy 
structure, will interact with existing structures, including the institution of traditional leadership.  
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Figure 1: The Levubu area of Limpopo Province 
 
 
 
